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Abstract
Camouflaged objects are generally difficult to be detected in their natural environment
even for human beings. In this paper, we propose a novel bio-inspired network, named
the MirrorNet, that leverages both instance segmentation and adversarial attack for the
camouflaged object segmentation. Differently from existing networks for segmenta-
tion, our proposed network possesses two segmentation streams: the main stream and
the adversarial stream corresponding with the original image and its flipped image, re-
spectively. The output from the adversarial stream is then fused into the main stream’s
result for the final camouflage map to boost up the segmentation accuracy. Extensive
experiments conducted on the public CAMO dataset demonstrate the effectiveness of
our proposed network. Our proposed method achieves 89% in accuracy, outperforming
the state-of-the-arts.
Keywords: Camouflaged Object Segmentation, Bio-Inspired, Adversarial Attack
1. Introduction
The term “camouflage” was originally used to describe the behavior of an animal
or insect trying to hide itself from its surroundings to hunt or avoid being hunted [1],
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Figure 1: A few examples of camouflaged objects in CAMO dataset [2]. From left to right, camouflaged
objects (e.g., fish, chameleon, insect) are followed by artificial camouflaged objects (e.g., solider, body paint-
ing).
namely naturally camouflaged objects [2]. This ability is useful to reduce risk of being
detected and increase their survival probability. For example, chameleons or fishes can
change appearance of their bodies to match color and pattern of surrounding environ-
ments (see Fig. 1). Human adopted this mechanism and began to apply it widely on the
battlefield. For example, soldiers and war equipment are applied the camouflage effect
by dressing or coloring their appearance to blend them with their surroundings (see
Fig. 1), namely artificially camouflaged objects [2]. Artificial camouflage has been
also applied into entertainment (e.g., magic show) or art (e.g., body painting). Figure 1
shows a few examples of both natural and artificial camouflaged objects in real life, in
which these camouflaged objects are not identified obviously.
Autonomously detecting/segmenting camouflaged objects is thus a difficult task
where discriminative features do not play an important role since we have to ignore
objects that capture our attention. While detecting camouflaged objects is technically
challenging on the one hand, it is beneficial in various practical scenarios, on the other,
to include surveillance systems and search-and-rescue missions.
Figure 2 shows several examples that camouflaged objects are failed to be detected
by state-of-the-art object segmentation networks. Moreover, there are plenty of crea-
tures in nature that have evolved over time to confuse themselves with their surround-
ings and even harder to be detected. Therefore, the study of detecting these less obvi-
ous objects which we call it camouflaged object in this paper, is necessary in the field
which targets detecting all objects in all scenes. Note that camouflage is a very subjec-
tive concept here. An object, such as a person which is regarded as a common class in
MS-COCO [4], can be considered as a camouflaged object when he is hiding himself
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Figure 2: Failure examples of the state-of-the-art method on camouflaged object segmentation. From top
to bottom: the original images, the ground-truth maps, the camouflage maps of ANet-DHS [2], and ANet-
SRM [2], and the instance segmentation results of Mask R-CNN [3]. We remark that all these methods are
fine-tuned on the camouflage dataset [2].
as a sniper. In other words, we treat all objects that are too similar to their surroundings
because of their color, texture, or both as camouflaged object and its complement set
as non-camouflaged object. It is time-consuming and laborious to collect data from all
target objects in particular scenes which presents camouflage to improve models, and
it is not well adaptable. Moreover, what camouflage has in common is that its features
are very little different from its surroundings. Therefore, it is reasonable to treat all
objects of different classes but similar to the background as one class.
Most state-of-the-art Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)-based models [5, 6, 7]
simulate human brain. Therefore, the CNN-based models may also be fooled just
like human [8]. This is also true for camouflaged objects, which attempt to fool our
human visual perception. Through time, they evolve to well blend their appearance
to the background. On the other hand, color-blind people are often better at detecting
camouflaged objects [9]. This is perhaps because they rely less on colors and more on
form and texture to discern the world around them. This motivates us to look at other
bio-inspired features.
An object becomes a successful camouflaged object when it elegantly blends into
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the surrounding environment to create a familiar natural scene that can hide the ob-
ject. By changing the viewpoint of the same scene, we expect to have a possibility
to escape from such an illusion. This visual-psychological phenomenon motivates our
bio-inspired solution to detect camouflaged objects by changing the viewpoint of the
scene. We realize that just a simple flipping operation also can generate new views of
the same scene. Indeed, the flipped images accidentally break the natural layout which
leads to the much difference between the background and the camouflaged objects.
Inspired by above visual-psychological phenomenon, we are looking at a method to
break the capability to prevent human/machine vision from recognizing camouflaged
objects through changing the viewpoint. In this paper, we propose a new simple yet
efficient bio-inspired framework, which greatly improves the existing camouflage ob-
ject recognition performance. The framework leverages the advantages of cutting-edge
models [10, 5] , which are well trained on large-scale datasets like ImageNet [11] and
MS-COCO [4] datasets, making the performance of this framework surpass ANet [2]
which is the state-of-the-art camouflaged object segmentation. The proposed frame-
work consists of two streams, the main stream for segmenting original image and the
adversarial stream utilizing flipped image, whereas the flipped image stream exploits
the bio-inspired adversarial attack. Indeed, viewpoint change by flipping operation is
useful to escape from the easy-to-be-fooled appearance of camouflaged objects. Lever-
aging this simple but effective approach can detect images mapping to discover more
details, to further improve the performance. To solve the insufficiency of limited train-
ing data, we also utilize object-level flipping for natural data augmentation for network
training. Extensive experiments on the benchmark CAMO dataset [2] for camouflaged
object segmentation show the superiority of our proposed method over the state-of-the-
arts.
Our contributions are as follows.
• Differently from the state-of-the-art ANet [2], where classification stream and
segmentation stream are applied on the whole image, in this work, we first obtain
object proposal, then we apply segmentation on each object proposal.
• As an attack to natural setting, we integrate additional adversarial stream which
utilizes horizontally flipped images, for mirror detection to support the main
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stream. We introduce the Data Augmentation in the Wild to solve the data insuf-
ficiency.
• Last but not least, we conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate the perfor-
mance of the proposed framework.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first reviews related work.
We briefly introduce our motivation in Section 3. Section 4 discusses details the pro-
posed framework. Section 5 reports the experimental results and the ablation study.
Finally, Section 6 draws the conclusion and paves way to the future work.
2. Related Work
2.1. Camouflaged Object Segmentation
In literature, the mainstreams of the computer vision community mainly focus on
the detection/segmentation of the non-camouflaged objects, i.e., salient object, objects
with predefined classes. There exist many research works on both general object de-
tection, i.e., Region RCNN (RCNN) [12], Fast RCNN [13], Faster RCNN [14], and
salient object detection, i.e., SRM [15], EGNet [16], CPD [17], PFANet [18], BAS-
Net [19], and SP [20]. Meanwhile, the camouflage object recognition has not been
well explored in the literature. Early works related to camouflage are dedicated to
detecting the foreground region even when some of their texture is similar to the back-
ground [21, 22, 23]. These works distinguish foreground and background based on
simple features such as color, intensity, shape, orientation, and edge. A few methods
based on handcrafted low-level features (i.e., texture [24, 25, 26] and motion [27, 28])
are proposed to tackle the problem of camouflage detection. However, all these meth-
ods work for only a few cases of simple and non-uniform background, thus their perfor-
mances are unsatisfactory in camouflaged object segmentation due to strong similarity
between the foreground and the background. Recently, Le et al. [2] proposed an end-
to-end network, called ANet, for camouflaged object segmentation through integrating
classification information into segmentation. Fan et al. [29] introduced SINet with two
main modules, namely the search module S and the identification module I.
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2.2. Adversarial Attack on Neural Networks
Although deep networks show the superior performance in visual recognition and
feature representation, they are also vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Adversarial at-
tack can be treated as optical illusions, which easily fool and outsmart the deep models.
Actually, by manipulating pixels in an image, we can trick a classification network to
misclassify that image. A small change in the input image such as noise, lighting, or
orientation can drive networks to misclassify categories [30, 31, 32]. Networks also
fail to recognize the same object when it is too close or under Affine transformed [8].
Regarding the camouflaged object segmentation problem, we propose an adversarial
attack based method to successfully break blending of camouflaged objects’ appear-
ance to the background. When we flip the images, the natural layout is accidentally
broken so that humans are not fooled by the natural settings and notice the difference
between camouflaged objects and surrounding regions.
On the other hand, it is possible to improve robustness of deep networks through
training by generating adversarial examples (i.e., perturbed images) [33, 34], or in-
corporating various 6D poses of objects [8]. On this direction, we take advantages of
adversarial attacks to improve the performance through using our novel data augmen-
tation in training networks.
Differently from existing work, which only interferes the training process, in this
work, we also utilize bio-inspired adversarial images (e.g., flip-stream) in the inference
process to guide the network towards the right track for camouflage object segmenta-
tion. We remark that our flip-stream and image flipping augmentation of existing work
are different for the purpose of usage and philosophy. For data augmentation, it applies
image flipping in only the training phase to improve the performance of networks. It
means that they consider normal image and flipped image are two totally different im-
ages. They want to learn as much as possible cases that can appear. Meanwhile, our
flip-stream is independent from image flipping augmentation. We apply flipped images
together with the original images in the inference phase. It means that we consider the
normal image and the flipped image as two-faces of the original image. Besides solving
the standard case (normal image), we also want to solve the rare case (flipped image).
6
3. Bio-inspired Adversarial Attack for Camouflaged Target
In biological vision studies, there exist viewpoint-invariant theories and viewpoint-
dependent theories [35, 36, 37]. In viewpoint-invariant theories, once a particular
object has been stored, the recognition of that object from novel viewpoints should
be unaffected, provided that the necessary features can be recovered from that view.
In view-dependent theories, once a particular object has been stored, recognition of
that object from novel views may be impaired, relative to recognition of previously
stored views. However, these theories were formed from the simple setting with the
outstanding stimuli (non-camouflaged objects) and the clear background, i.e., white
background. Indeed, it is natural for human vision to easily detect non-camouflaged
objects such as salient objects since they are outstanding from the background, while
it is harder for human to detect camouflaged objects since they are similar to the back-
ground. In other words, the visual difference between the background and the non-
camouflaged object(s) should be larger than the one between the background and the
camouflaged object(s). However, when we flip the images, humans are not fooled by
the natural settings and notice differences in the images. Therefore, the flipped images
accidentally break the natural layout which leads to the larger distance between the
background and the camouflaged objects.
To prove this conclusion intuitively, we compute the visual difference between the
main objects (the camouflaged and the non-camouflaged objects) with the back-
ground. In particular, we adopt the well-known deep learning model FCN [38] and its
variants to compute the difference distance. We use the pretrained model on PASCAL-
VOC [39] (with 20 semantic classes and the background class). We extract the confi-
dence score at the second last layer of FCN (h×w× 21). Then, we compute the mean
semantic vectors sbg , sfg for the background and the camouflaged/non-camouflaged
object regions (obtained from the ground truth maps), respectively. This ends up with
21-dim vector for both regions. `2 normalization is applied for both sbg and sfg . Then
the visual difference d between the main objects (the camouflaged/non-camouflaged
objects) with the background is computed as: d = ‖sfg − sbg‖2, where ‖.‖2 is the Eu-
clidean distance. We also compute the difference between the camo/non-camo object
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Method Non-Camo Camo Camo-Flipped
Color (RGB) 0.112 0.085 0.085
Color (lαβ) 0.217 0.143 0.143
Texton [40] 0.323 0.195 0.195
FCN (32s) [38] 0.520 0.352 0.354
FCN (8s) [38] 0.641 0.409 0.412
CRF-RNN [41] 0.786 0.460 0.462
Table 1: The visual difference between the camouflaged/non-camouflaged objects and the background with
different methods.
with the background in terms of color (RGB and lαβ), and texture (texton [40]).
Table 1 shows the visual difference with different settings. The difference in terms
of color is much smaller than the ones of features extracted from deep learning models.
lαβ shows a larger distance than RGB in the color space. Meanwhile, the textural
features, i.e., Texton [40], yield the larger distance which indicates the usefulness of
texture in the task of camouflaged object segmentation. The even larger distances in
feature space show that features from deep learning models may be helpful to detect
and segment camouflaged objects. Note that the features extracted from FCN, a CNN-
based model, actually capture the information of textures and edges. In fact, FCN and
CNN networks contain convolutional layers which learn spatial hierarchies of patterns
by preserving spatial relationships. In these networks, the first convolutional layer can
learn basic elements such as texture and edges [42]. Then, the second convolutional
layer can learn patterns composed of basic elements learned in the previous layer. The
training process continues until the deep network learns significantly complex patterns
and abstract visual concepts. This demonstrates the importance of low-level informa-
tion such as texture and edges in the task of camouflaged object segmentation.
In addition, the difference values of camo and camo-flip with the background are
identical in terms of color. It shows that the flipped stream is not useful in terms of
color. However, when we look at the difference in the feature space, the camo and non-
camo values are different (non-camo value is slightly better). It shows that the camo
flip in the feature space may be helpful for the task.
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As a closer look, the distance between main object and background is larger in non-
camouflaged and smaller in camouflaged images in all FCN and CRF-RNN settings.
In camouflaged images, most pixels of camouflaged objects are classified as back-
ground class which leads to the small distance. Meanwhile, most pixels of the main
non-camouflaged objects are classified with non-background classes which cause the
larger distance. We are also interested in the horizontally flipped images. Therefore,
we also compute the visual difference between the background and the camouflaged
objects in the horizontally flipped images. As shown in Table 1, the camouflaged-
flipped images generally produce larger distance. It seems that the horizontally flipped
images may contain useful information for the segmentation task. Note that the im-
ages of camouflaged objects are taken with the natural settings. Therefore, the flipped
images accidentally break the natural layout which lead to the larger distance between
the background and the camouflaged objects. This one absolutely paves way to our
proposed method.
The camouflaged object contains intrinsic and extrinsic information. The intrinsic
information means the difference between the camouflaged object and the background.
The small distance may be observed in the color space. The distance may be larger
in another space, i.e., deep learned feature space, semantic space. Meanwhile, the
extrinsic information means the external change onto the camouflaged object, for ex-
ample, rotating, translating, and flipping, so that the camouflaged object can be better
recognized. Therefore, our proposed framework captures both intrinsic and extrinsic
information of the camouflaged object.
4. Proposed Framework
4.1. MirrorNet Overview
Figure 3 depicts the overview of our proposed MirrorNet, the bio-inspired network
for camouflaged object segmentation. The MirrorNet actually consists of two streams,
the main stream for original image segmentation and the adversarial stream for flipped
image segmentation, whereas the horizontally flipped image stream exploits the bio-
inspired adversarial attack. Each stream traverses through the camouflaged object pro-
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Figure 3: The overview of our proposed framework. MirrorNet consists of two streams, namely, the main
stream for original image segmentation and the adversarial stream for horizontally flipped image segmenta-
tion.
posal, camouflaged object segmentation and yields the segmentation masks. The two
output masks from the two streams are finally fused to produce a pixel-wisely accurate
camouflage map which uniformly covers camouflaged objects. Here, the camouflaged
object segmentation targets at the intrinsic information. Meanwhile, the adversarial
stream aims to capture the extrinsic information.
4.2. Network Design and Architecture
4.2.1. Camouflaged Object Proposal
MirrorNet first attempts to localize the possible positions containing the camou-
flaged objects via Camouflaged Object Proposal component. Inspired by [14], we aim
to find the object positions, the object classes, and their camouflage masks in images
simultaneously. Follow the standard design in computer vision, the object position is
defined by a rectangle with respect to the top-left corner of the image; the object class
is defined over the rectangle; the object mask is encoded at every pixel inside the rect-
angle. Ideally, we want to detect all relevant objects in the image and map each pixel
in these objects to its most probable camouflage/non-camouflage label.
Here, our Camouflaged Object Proposal component adopts the Region Proposal
Network (RPN) [14]. RPN shares weights with the main convolutional backbone and
outputs bounding boxes (RoI / object proposal) at various sizes. For each RoI, a fixed-
size feature map is pooled from the image feature map using the RoIPool layer [14].
The RoIPool layer works by dividing the RoI into a regular grid and then max-pooling
the feature map values in each grid cell. This quantization, however, causes misalign-
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ments between the RoI and the extracted features due to the harsh rounding operations
when mapping the RoI coordinates from the input image space to the image feature map
space and when dividing the RoI into grid cells. In order to address this problem, our
Camouflaged Object Proposal component integrates Precise RoI Pooling (PrRoI) [43].
Indeed PrRoI Pooling uses average pooling instead of max pooling for each bin and has
a continuous gradient on bounding box coordinates. That is, one can take the deriva-
tives of some loss function with respect to the coordinates of each RoI and optimize
the RoI coordinates. PrRoI Pooling is also different from the RoI Align proposed in
Mask R-CNN. PrRoI Pooling uses a full integration-based average pooling instead of
sampling a constant number of points. This makes the gradient with respect to the
coordinates continuous.
4.2.2. Camouflaged Object Segmentation
Following [14], we use a multi-task loss L to jointly train the bounding box class,
the bounding box position, and the camouflage map (mask) as follows:
L = Lcls + Lloc + Lmask, (1)
where Lcls and Lloc are the output of the detection branch. Meanwhile, Lmask is de-
fined on the output of the segmentation branch. The object classification lossLcls(p, u)
is the multinomial cross entropy loss computed as follows:
Lcls(p, u) = − log pu, (2)
where pu is the softmax output for the true class u. The bounding box regression loss
Lloc(tu, v) is computed as the Smooth L1 loss [13] between the regressed box offset
tu (corresponding to the ground-truth object class u) and the ground-truth box offset v:
Lloc(tu, v) =
∑
i∈{x,y,w,h}
SmoothL1(t
u
i − vi) (3)
The segmentation lossLmask(m, s) is the multinomial cross entropy loss computed
as follows:
Lmask(m, s) = −1
N
∑
i∈RoI
logmisi , (4)
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Figure 4: Exemplary samples of Data Augmentation in the Wild. From top to bottom: the original images
with the ground-truth map, the flipped images, the cloning instance images.
where misi is the softmax output at pixel i for the true label si, N is the number of
pixels in the RoI.
4.2.3. Mask Fusion
We first flip all detected bounding boxes and their corresponding camouflage map
(mask) from the adversarial stream. Then, we use threshold θ = 0.5 to eliminate
bounding boxes with low prediction scores. After that, the prediction scores of bound-
ing boxes from the two streams are sorted in descending order. Then, we apply the
“winner take all” strategy to prune the redundant boxes. In particular, for each bound-
ing box from highest prediction scores to lowest scores, we check the bounding boxes
with lower scores, if the lower score bounding box and the higher score bounding box
have 50% mutual overlap, the bounding box with lower score will be excluded. Then,
we discard the bounding boxes (and their corresponding camouflage maps) classified
as non-camouflage.
Finally we accumulate the camouflage maps (masks) from the retaining bounding
boxes and then normalize the output, resulting the final camouflage map.
4.3. Data Augmentation in the Wild
Since non-camouflaged object segmentation attracts most attention compared to
camouflaged object segmentation, there are only a few relevant datasets, and most of
them have the problem of too few samples. Therefore, we adopt the recently built
CAMO dataset [2] which proposed and benchmarked by the previous state-of-the-art
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camouflaged object segmentation, for the training of instance segmentation framework.
The dataset is divided into camouflage and non-camouflage categories, each containing
1,000 training and 250 test set, and a total of 2,500 manually annotated ground truths.
Most of the dataset images are mammals, insects, birds, and aquatic animals, each
with approximately similar proportions, and a small number of reptiles, human art,
soldiers, and amphibians. The diversity of species in this dataset makes our model very
adaptable, but it must be pointed out that it also has insufficient samples compared to
mainstream datasets like COCO [4].
We first compute the number of connected components on the binary ground truth
maps of CAMO dataset (the training part). There are many scenarios where multiple
connected components belong to one instance. To avoid cherry pick the training sam-
ples, we exclude all training images with more than 2 connected components. Then, we
compute the bounding box for the single component in the images. In order to increase
the number of training samples, we introduce the Augmentation in Wild. In particu-
lar, we first perform translating and flipping instances. Furthermore, it is essentially
different from data augmentation for non-camouflaged objects, because to determinate
whether an object is camouflaged is not only depends on its own features, but also its
surroundings. Therefore, we also clone the object instances and place them onto dif-
ferent image regions with a small color difference in the background. Figure 4 shows
some samples of augmented data. In this way, we increase the number of training
samples, thus alleviating the problem of insufficient data.
4.4. Implementation Details
To demonstrate the generality and flexibility of our proposed MirrorNet, we employ
various recent state-of-the-art backbones, i.e., ResNet [10] and ResNeXt [5]. Our im-
plementation is based on the published code of Mask R-CNN 1, which can be adopted
to train camouflaged object proposal and camouflaged object segmentation compo-
nents. Furthermore, we replace the ROI Align layer with a Precise RoI Pooling layer
(PrRoI) [43].
1https://github.com/facebookresearch/maskrcnn-benchmark
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The training process is conducted by fine-tuning the available pre-trained model on
camouflage images and non-camouflage images of the CAMO dataset [2] and our Data
Augmentation in the Wild. In particular, we set the size of each mini-batch to 256 and
used the Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) optimization with a moment β = 0.9 and
a weight decay of 0.0001. We trained our network for 120k iterations with the base
learning rate of 0.00125, which is decreased by 10 times every time we reach the next
steps at 80k iterations and 100k iterations. We also remark that we implemented our
method in PyTorch, and conducted all the experiments on a computer with a 2.40GHz
processor (Intel Xeon CPU E5-2620), 64 GB of RAM, and one GeForce GTX TITAN
X GPU. The code and training models will be published upon the acceptance of this
paper.
5. Experiments
In this section, we first introduce dataset and evaluation criteria used in experi-
ments. We compare our MirrorNet with state-of-the-art methods on the CAMO dataset [2],
to demonstrate that instance segmentation and bio-inspired adversarial attack can boost
up the camouflaged object segmentation. We also present the efficiency of our general
MirrorNet through the ablation study.
5.1. Benchmark Dataset and Evaluation Criteria
We used the entire the testing images in the CAMO dataset for the evaluation. We
note that the zero-mask ground-truth labels (all pixels have zero values) are for the
non-camouflaged object images.
Similarly to [2], we used the F-measure (Fβ) [44], Intersection Over Union (IOU) [38],
and Mean Absolute Error (MAE) as the metrics to evaluate obtained results. The first
metric, F-measure, is a balanced measurement between precision and recall as follows:
Fβ =
(
1 + β2
)
Precision×Recall
β2 × Precision+Recall . (5)
Note that we set β2 = 0.3 as used in [44, 45] to put an emphasis on precision. IOU
is the area ratio of the overlapping against the union between the predicted camouflage
14
Table 2: Comparison with FCN and ANet variants on two settings: Only Camouflaged Images (the left part),
and the full CAMO dataset (the right part). The evaluation is based on F-measure [44] (the higher the better),
IOU [38] (the higher the better), and MAE (the lower the better). The 1st and 2nd places are shown in blue
and red, respectively.
Dataset in test Only Camouflaged Images Full CAMO dataset
Groups Method Adaptive Threshold Fixed Threshold Adaptive Threshold Fixed Threshold
MAE ⇓ Fβ ⇑ IOU ⇑ Fβ ⇑ IOU ⇑ MAE ⇓ Fβ ⇑ IOU ⇑ Fβ ⇑ IOU ⇑
FCN-finetuned
DHS [50] 0.138 59.6 38.8 61.4 36.7 0.072 79.6 67.9 80.8 68.1
DSS [51] 0.145 58.2 38.5 58.4 38.1 0.076 79.0 68.6 79.2 68.7
SRM [15] 0.127 66.3 45.4 65.6 42.1 0.067 83.0 71.7 83.1 70.8
WSS [52] 0.149 64.2 43.9 63.8 38.2 0.085 81.1 67.8 82.0 68.7
ANet setting [2]
ANet-DHS 0.130 62.6 43.7 63.1 42.3 0.072 81.2 71.2 81.4 70.5
ANet-DSS 0.132 58.7 40.4 60.7 39.0 0.067 79.5 70.1 80.4 69.4
ANet-SRM 0.126 65.4 47.5 66.2 46.6 0.069 82.6 73.2 83.0 72.7
ANet-WSS 0.140 66.1 45.9 64.3 40.7 0.078 82.6 71.0 82.0 69.7
MirrorNet setting
MirrorNet (ResNet-50) 0.100 72.3 58.1 72.5 58.4 0.062 86.1 77.9 86.2 78.0
MirrorNet (ResNet-101) 0.089 73.4 60.4 73.5 60.5 0.053 86.7 79.4 86.7 79.4
MirrorNet (ResNeXt-101) 0.084 76.6 62.7 76.9 62.9 0.051 88.2 80.4 88.4 80.5
MirrorNet (ResNeXt-152) 0.077 78.4 65.8 78.5 65.7 0.045 89.3 82.2 89.3 82.2
map and the ground-truth map. Meanwhile, MAE is the average of the pixel-wise
absolute differences between the predicted camouflage map and the ground-truth.
For MAE, we used the raw grayscale camouflage map. For the other metrics, we
binarized the results depending on two contexts. In the first context, we assume that
camouflaged objects are always present in every image like salient objects; we used an
adaptive threshold [46] θ = µ+ η where µ and η are the mean value and the standard
deviation of the map, respectively. In the second context which is much closer to a real-
world scenario, we assume that the existence of camouflaged objects is not guaranteed
in each image; we used the fixed threshold θ = 0.5.
As proposed in [29], we also use E-measure (Eφ) [47], S-measure (Sα) [48], and
weighted F-measure (Fωβ ) [49] as alternative metrics.
5.2. Comparison with FCN and ANet Variants
We conduct the experiments on CAMO dataset with two settings, namely, only
camouflaged object set, and the full set. To investigate the impact of different back-
bones on our proposed MirrorNet, we fine-tuned pre-trained models of ResNet (ResNet-
50, ResNet-101) [10], and ResNeXt (ResNeXt-101, ResNeXt-152) [5] on CAMO re-
spectively. It is interesting for the computer vision community to see the performance
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Table 3: Ablation study results on the full CAMO dataset. The evaluation is based on F-measure [44] (the
higher the better), IOU [38] (the higher the better), and MAE (the lower the better). The best results are
shown in blue. The detail of each baseline is clearly introduced in Section 5.3.
Method
Settings Adaptive Threshold Fixed Threshold
Main
Stream
Adversarial
Stream
Data Augmentation
in the Wild
Pooling MAE ⇓ Fβ ⇑ IOU ⇑ Fβ ⇑ IOU ⇑
Baseline 1 X X PrRoI 0.051 88.4 80.8 88.6 80.8
Baseline 2 X X PrRoI 0.050 88.6 81.3 88.8 81.4
Baseline 3 X X PrRoI 0.048 88.6 82.0 88.8 82.0
Baseline 4 X X X RoI Align 0.047 88.8 81.8 88.9 81.8
MirrorNet X X X PrRoI 0.045 89.3 82.2 89.4 82.2
of different frameworks in the camouflaged object segmentation problem. Particularly,
we compare our MirrorNet with ANet family networks [2] (denoted by ANet-DHS,
ANet-DSS, ANet-SRM, ANet-WSS), the-state-of-the-art for camouflaged object seg-
mentation, and the original FCNs (DHS [50], DSS [51], SRM [15], and WSS [52]).
All these methods were also fine-tuned on the CAMO dataset with their published pa-
rameters.
As shown in Table 2, ANet variants outperform FCN-finetuned methods and ANet
variants with the same backbone. Meanwhile, our proposed MirrorNet significantly
outperforms all baselines. MirrorNet achieves the best result with ResNeXt-152 back-
bone. This is totally consistent with our discussion in Section 3, i.e., the better back-
bones tend to work better in MirrorNet. Note that all baselines, i.e., FCN-finetuned
or ANet variants are trained and tested separately on different sets of data, for exam-
ple, training and testing on only camouflaged image sets, or training and testing on
the full set. Meanwhile, our MirrorNet and its variants are only trained on the full set.
However, their performance is also significantly better in the only camouflaged image
set.
5.3. Ablation Study
In this subsection, we investigate the impact of different components in our pro-
posed MirrorNet such as dual stream, data augmentation, and RoI pooling mechanisms.
Experimental results are shown in Table 3. We remark that we use the ResNeXt-152
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backbone for all compared methods.
Dual Stream: We investigate the performance of each stream in the MirrorNet,
namely, main stream and adversarial stream. We compare our completed MirrorNet,
which have both streams, with using single streams (denoted by Baseline 1 for only the
main stream and Baseline 2 for only the adversarial stream). As shown in Table 3, our
completed MirrorNet outperforms baselines using individual stream. In addition, the
adversarial stream output is better than the main stream output alone.
Data Augmentation in the Wild: We suspected that one of the major factors af-
fecting the camouflaged objects segmentation was the limited number of training data.
To evaluate the impact of Data Augmentation in the Wild, we compare MirrorNet with-
out using Data Augmentation in the Wild in the training process, denoted by Baseline
3. Table 3 shows that using Data Augmentation in the Wild in the training process
outperforms the one without using the augmented data.
ROI Pooling: We further investigate the performance of different ROI pooling
mechanism, namely, RoI Align (denoted by Baseline 4) and PrROI. As also seen in
Table 3, PrRoI-based MirrorNet surpasses RoI Align-based MirrorNet. In addition,
RoI Align-based MirrorNet outperforms the main stream and the adversarial stream
(with PrRoI). This clearly shows the importance of the mask fusion.
5.4. Comparison with State-of-the-art Methods
We further compare the performance of MirrorNet with state-of-the-arts reported
in [29]. Table 4 shows the performance of different methods in terms of E-measure
(Eφ) [47], S-measure (Sα) [48], weighted F-measure (Fωβ ) [49], and MAE [2]. Note
that these metrics were proposed in [29]. As can be seen, the recently proposed meth-
ods tend to achieve better results. Our proposed method, MirrorNet, achieves the best
performance in terms of Eφ, Sα, Fωβ , and MAE. MirrorNet with ResNeXt-152 back-
bone surpasses the state-of-the-art methods by a remarkable margin in all metrics.
To make a fair comparison, we evaluate MirrorNet on ResNet-50 backbone. In fact,
our MirrorNet (ResNet-50) achieves 0.741, 0.804, 0.652, 0.100 in terms of Sα,Eφ, Fωβ ,
and MAE, respectively. Note that our network is trained on CAMO dataset only. Mean-
while, SINet [29] (also trained on CAMO only) obtained 0.708, 0.706, 0.476, 0.131 in
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Table 4: Comparison of state-of-the-art methods on CAMO dataset (Camouflaged object only). The evalu-
ation is based on E-measure (Eφ) [47] (the higher the better), S-measure (Sα) [48] (the higher the better),
weighted F-measure (Fωβ ) [49] (the higher the better), and MAE (the lower the better). The best results are
shown in blue.
Method Year Training Setting
Evaluation Metrics
Sα ⇑ Eφ ⇑ Fωβ ⇑ MAE ⇓
UNet++ [53] 2018 CAMO [2]+COD [29]+CPD [54] 0.599 0.653 0.392 0.149
PiCANet [55] 2018 CAMO [2]+COD [29]+CPD [54] 0.609 0.584 0.356 0.156
MSRCNN [56] 2019 CAMO [2]+COD [29]+CPD [54] 0.617 0.669 0.454 0.133
PoolNet [57] 2019 CAMO [2]+COD [29]+CPD [54] 0.702 0.698 0.494 0.129
BASNet [19] 2019 CAMO [2]+COD [29]+CPD [54] 0.618 0.661 0.413 0.159
PFANet [18] 2019 CAMO [2]+COD [29]+CPD [54] 0.659 0.622 0.391 0.172
CPD [17] 2019 CAMO [2]+COD [29]+CPD [54] 0.726 0.729 0.550 0.115
HTC [58] 2019 CAMO [2]+COD [29]+CPD [54] 0.476 0.442 0.174 0.172
EGNet [16] 2019 CAMO [2]+COD [29]+CPD [54] 0.732 0.768 0.583 0.104
SINet [29] 2020 CAMO [2]+COD [29]+CPD [54] 0.751 0.771 0.606 0.100
ANet-SRM [2] 2019 CAMO [2] 0.682 0.685 0.484 0.126
SINet [29] 2020 CAMO [2] 0.708 0.706 0.476 0.131
MirrorNet (ResNet-50) 2020 CAMO [2] 0.741 0.804 0.652 0.100
MirrorNet (ResNeXt-152) 2020 CAMO [2] 0.785 0.849 0.719 0.077
terms of Sα, Eφ, Fωβ , and MAE, respectively. This shows the superiority of MirrorNet
over SINet for all metrics with 4.66%, 13.88%, 36.97%, 23.66% gain regarding Sα,
Eφ, Fωβ , and MAE, respectively. In [29], Fan et al. further improved SINet by train-
ing it on the dataset combination of CAMO [2], COD [29], and CPD [54]. However,
training on multiple datasets is out of the scope of this paper.
Figure 5 shows the visual comparison of different methods. As illustrated in the
figure, our MirrorNet variants yield better results than all state-of-the-art methods. Our
results are close to the ground truth and focus on the camouflaged objects. From the re-
sults, our MirrorNet successfully segments the camouflaged objects images in CAMO
dataset [2]. As discussed in [2], CAMO dataset consists of images from challenging
scenarios such as object appearance (the camouflaged object has similar color and tex-
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Figure 5: Comparison of the results from different methods. From left to right: the original image, the ground
truth map, the predicted camouflaged maps of ANet-SRM [2], SINet [29], and our methods MirrorNet
(ResNet-101), MirrorNet (ResNeXt-101), MirrorNet (ResNeXt-152).
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ture with the background), background clutter, shape complexity, small object, object
occlusion, multiple objects, and distraction. This demonstrates that our MirrorNet can
well handle a variety of camouflaged objects.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a simple and flexible end-to-end network, namely Mir-
rorNet, for camouflaged object segmentation. Our bio-inspired MirrorNet leverages
both instance segmentation and adversarial attack to segment camouflaged objects in
images. Particularly, we propose to use the main stream and the adversarial stream,
which is embedded image flipping, to effectively capture different layouts of the scene,
leading to significant performance in identifying camouflaged objects. The extensive
experimental results show that our proposed method achieves state-of-the-art perfor-
mance on the public CAMO dataset.
In the future, we will investigate different adversarial schemes. In addition, we
aim to further explore the problem of camouflaged instance segmentation. Through ex-
periments, our data augmentation slightly improves the performance as shown in the
ablation study. Note that data augmentation is not the main focus of this paper. Ex-
ploring different data augmentation methods is an interesting topic which is left for
future work. We are also interested in applying camouflaged object segmentation into
practical systems [59].
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